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The Middle East, in general, as one of the most arid and water
scarce regions in the world, has a long history of water-related
conflicts that extends for 5,000 years. The geopolitical importance of
the region, as well as the ongoing ethnic and religious controversy,
aggravates the usual problems associated with the presence of such
natural resources as oil and water.' In this article, I will discuss one of
the most difficult water conflicts of the region: the tension between
Israel and the Palestinians concerning access to West Bank
groundwater resources. Nevertheless, it is vital to remember that it is
not possible to reach fair, sustainable and equitable arrangements for
water sharing between the two parties without taking account of the
other water resources in the region, such as the Jordan River basin,
and in the larger setting, the waters of the Nile River and of the
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Basin.
The ongoing profound, complex relationship between Israel and
the Palestinians has produced one of the most antagonistic and
prolonged conflicts of our time. There exists a greater potential for
deadlock on the question of water than on other aspects of the
conflict.2 However, water has not often been treated as a prominent
1. Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict. Fresh Water Resources and International
Security, 18 INT'L SECURITY 79, 85-89, 111-12 (1993).
2. Aaron Wolf argues that (1) water, as a strategic resource, has played a larger
role in regional conflict than is generally known; (2) water issues have precipitated
some conflict and added to existing tensions in the region; (3) occasionally, water
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aspect of the Israeli-Arab confrontation. Only in recent years has this
issue come to the foreground, as an acute and growing shortage of
surface water and groundwater resources in the region has worsened
the conflict over shared water. The water issue between Israel and
Palestinians has inflammatory implications within a greater area that
includes Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.' These countries possess a
common geology and hydrology in the Jordan River basin that
includes the Dead Sea and Golan Heights. With an expected
doubling of their total population over the next twenty-five years,
each of these countries faces (and has already faced) very serious
water problems. Jordan and Palestine are presently unable to meet
minimum water requirements for the essential human needs of their
respective populations. These issues are especially severe in the case
of Israel and its Occupied Territories, where the people of the two
societies are destined to exist on small amounts of land with large
population densities, yet containing very little water. The physical
interdependency of the two societies requires close cooperation
between the two societies with respect to water.
The issue is serious, and yet continues to be neglected in most
discussions of the conflict. Despite the immediate and vital
importance of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
international community shows almost no disposition to regard water
as one of the five major problems in the attempt to establish peace.
The other salient issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Jewish
settlements, and the status of a future Palestinian entity are assumed
to be of vital importance. While acknowledged as relevant, water has
not in the past been viewed as a major stumbling block. The killing
and wounding of demonstrators and demolition of homes are
dramatic violations of human rights. In contrast, dried up wells, an
open sewage canal, or the lack of a system of piped clean water are
matters that cannot compete for a spot on the nightly news. Even
Palestinians can quickly forget the misappropriation or misuse of
groundwater, precisely because it involves subterranean resources
issues have led to dialogue and attempts at cooperation. See HYDROPOLITICs ALONG
THE JORDAN RIVER 1-2 (1995).
3. However, in the past, water has played a significant role in the precipitation
of violence. Indeed, many see the Syrian attempt in the 1960s to divert the upper
sources of the Jordan, and thereby to deprive Israel of their water, as the first link in
the chain which led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War. See NURIT KLIOT,
WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 204-08 (1994).
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which easily escape from the eyes of people."
II. Shared Surface and Ground Water Resources
There are two major water resources in the region: the surface
water resources of the Jordan Basin, mainly the Jordan and Yarmouk
rivers, shared by Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Palestinians; and
groundwater resources from the Mountain Aquifers that extend from
the West Bank into Israel.
1. JORDAN RIVER BASIN: Following the collapse of Ottoman
Empire after WWI, the location of water resources, particularly the
Jordan River, had an important influence shaping the boundaries of
the French and British mandates that later became the borders
between Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The Jordan River basin, with all
its competing national and economic pressures, provides a clear
example of the strategic importance of water as a scarce resource.
The largest water resource of Israel, Palestine and Jordan is the
Jordan River, despite the fact that the river is one of the smallest in
the region in length (200 miles) as well as in flow. The main
tributaries of the Jordan are the Hasbani, Dan, Baniyas and Yarmuk.
The first three rivers converge in Israel, north of Lake Galilee, to
form the upper Jordan River. Only the sources of the Dan originate
within the borders of Israel. The Hasbani springs lie in the part of
Lebanon that was, until June 2000, incorporated into the occupied
Israel security zone in southern Lebanon. The Baniyas water drains
from the Golan Heights, a territory formerly under Syrian control
and occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.
South of Lake Galilee, the Jordan meets with the Yarmuk River,
which contains water originating from Syria and Jordan, and
continues to flow south toward the Dead Sea. Syria and Jordan
established a series of dams on the Yarmuk River to obtain maximum
profit from every drop of water. By the time the river reaches the
Palestinian West Bank the upstream riparians have used virtually all
the water. Israel treats Lake Galilee as a reservoir to convey drinking
water through its National Water Carrier to the populated coastal
4. Gamal Abouali, Natural Resources under Occupation: The Status of
Palestinian Water Under International Law, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 411, 414 (1998).
Abouali refers to Raja Shehadeh's book OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST
BANK, which dedicates 45 pages to Israel's expropriation of West Bank land and only
one page to water expropriation.
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plain and the farms in the Negev Desert. The water that flows into
the Upper Jordan that services Israel's National Water Carrier
network comes mainly from the Banias River, which rises in southern
Lebanon. Water problems on the Israeli coastal plain and in southern
Israel also influence the entire Jordan basin because Israel's National
Water Carrier transfers Jordan water to the drainage basin of the
Mediterranean Sea.
Lebanon, by virtue of its relatively wet climate, is not dependent
on the Jordan basin for supplying its water needs. Syria enjoys
alternative water sources in the north, but the country suffers from a
lack of water in the south. Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan are
greatly dependent on the water supply from the Jordan-Yarmuk
basin. Due to the occupation of the Jordan valley by the Israeli army,
the Palestinian population on the West Bank is unable to have any
access to the river, and cannot use this water for irrigation or human
consumption. But even if they could gain access, it would not be of
much value. They would have to deal with a brackish muddy stream
currently not fit for productive use. All the basin states have rates of
population increase that are among the highest in the world. The
need for water is growing constantly, and the exploitation of water
from the Jordan River, including its tributaries, has almost reached
the point of saturation. From 1948 to the mid 1990s a state of war
existed between Israel and the Arab states that pertained to the river
basin. In this period many development projects were executed
unilaterally by the riparian states, especially Israel, Syria and Jordan.
As if these factors were not trouble enough, a considerable part
of the basin lies in a semiarid or desert region, and the river's
discharge varies markedly from year to year. The Jordan River basin
is a unique situation due to its physical and political structure. Its
special character obliges us to look beyond the drainage basin to
address several additional water issues linked to it.6 One of these is
the groundwater of the western highland aquifer in Palestine/Israel.
2. MOUNTAIN AQUIFERS: The most legally and politically
controversial shared groundwater in the region lies mainly under
occupied Palestinian terrain. It has an underground geological
structure with a capacity to store potable water. The groundwater
percolates into Israel across the Palestinian-Israeli Green Line, but
5. ARNON SOFFER, RIVERS OF FIRE: THE CONFLICT OVER WATER IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 121 (Murray Rosovsky & Nina Copaken trans., 1999).
6. Id. at 127-28.
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the entire aquifer complex is totally controlled by Israel under
conditions of prolonged occupation. These aquifers, also known
collectively as the central highland aquifer, are in fact three separate
water bodies located in the central highland backbone of Palestine,
which includes the mountains of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).
The western aquifer, also known as the Yarkon-Taninim, yields 340-
360 million cubic meters of water annually. This is the best quality
water in all of Palestine. At present all this water is pumped in a
system of springs on both sides of the Green line. The northern
aquifer, also called Nablus-Jenin, yields a total of about 140 million
cubic meters of water. The third water body is the eastern aquifer.
At present, about 100 million cubic meter of water are pumped from
this aquifer. It is estimated that the potential of this aquifer is greater
than the amount drawn from it at this time.
As suggested earlier, these three water bodies constituting the
central highland aquifer are the most important water source in
Palestine. Approximately 40% of the groundwater, or one quarter of
its total high-quality renewable freshwater supply - upon which Israel
depends -originates in the Palestinian Territories. It is assessed to be
a volume of approximately 600 million cubic meters. This aquifer is
on both sides of the Green Line, so its water would appear to be
international, although Israel, West Bank settlers and the Palestinians
each make exclusive claims to use and control. The protections of the
quality of this water and the prevention of pollution are of great
importance for the future and have major geopolitical implications.
Drilling to pump the water to the surface may be done only in places
of water accumulation, and these are not to be found everywhere on
the West Bank. Places of water accumulation lie close to the Green
Line, enabling drilling to be done on either side of this dividing line
between the two peoples. This fact is of central importance in the
final determination of the border between the state of Israel and the
Palestinian people, and in any accompanying agreement governing
the use of the water of the aquifers by the two sides.7
The Gaza Strip is not physically attached to the West Bank, or to
the Jordan basin, but it is an integral part of the Palestinian entity,
and is far from being self-sufficient in water. The aquifer system
under Gaza does not provide water suitable for human consumption,
although it is currently relied upon to supply 80% of Gaza's drinking
water. This is a most unsatisfactory situation. Therefore, any
7. Id. at 132-33.
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solution concerning the requirements of water for the Palestinians
must necessarily take into account the needs of the Gaza strip, as well
as of the West Bank.
In the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967, the general
hydropolitical map of the Middle East changed dramatically. Israel
gained important water resources by acquiring two of the three
Jordan River headwaters, riparian access to the entire river, and
control over the recharge zones of the Mountain Aquifers that
currently supply one third of Israel's fresh water supply. By
occupying the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel also controls the Banias
tributary. After the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israel maintained
effective control over the remaining Hasbani tributary as well as the
strategic Litani River. When Israel withdrew from almost all of
southern Lebanon in 1999, it also lost control over these waters.
III. Water Consumption Profile
The Israeli-Palestinian water conflict can be better understood if
we compare figures concerning the water consumption of both
peoples. In the Israeli National Water Policy Plan, the Israeli
government estimates an average per capita consumption of 35 cubic
meters for a Palestinian on the West Bank, and 321 cubic meters for
Israelis in Israel and the settlements.8 According to standards of the
WHO, people with an average per capita consumption less than 500
cubic meters live in a condition of severe water stress. Although the
Israeli average is well below this level, it does not prevent Israeli
society from achieving a standard of living that is comparable to that
of Western Europe and the United States. The Israeli government
relies on high-tech irrigation and public awareness about the need to
prevent waste and pollution of waters, and has been unwilling to
consider reducing the water supply available for urban or agriculture
use.9 Israeli policy also aims to convince Israeli citizens that it is
irresponsible Palestinian water use that endangers the quality and
quantity of the shared Mountain aquifers, thereby diverting attention
from its own high per capita water use that is almost 10 times as great
8. Stefan Deconinck, Israeli water policy in a regional context of conflict:
prospects for sustainable development for Israelis and Palestinians, at
<http://waternet.UGent.be/waterpolicy.htm> (visited Jan. 26, 2005).
9. When an Israeli Infrastructure Minister suggested imposing restrictions on
irrigation in agriculture, in order to safeguard drinking water for the Israeli
households, his colleagues in the government blew a whistle on him and refused to
discuss any measure of this kind. Id.
[Vol. 28:3
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as that of the Palestinians.
Palestinians, however, are in a much less favorable position
having so little available water as compared to their Israeli neighbors.
Both societies are facing a problem of growing demand for potable
water due to population growth and anticipated economic
development. Consumption of water by the Palestinian population of
the West Bank (approximately 2 million) has not exceeded 125 MCM
per year, or 14 to 18% of total available water. Israel water
authorities provide for a per capita water allocation ten times greater
for Jewish settlers (approximately 200,000 in West Bank and 200,000
in East Jerusalem) than is allocated to West Bank Palestinians.' °
Moreover, settlers' water charges are heavily subsidized, but those of
Palestinians are not. It has been estimated that Palestinians pay as
much as six times more for a unit of water than Jewish settlers.
The Palestinian economy relies heavily on irrigated agriculture;
where irrigation accounts for 73% of Palestinian water use each year,
industry uses only about 2%, with the remaining 25% used for
domestic and commercial purposes. But almost 55 years of
displacement and 35 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip has left a damaging imprint. Israeli water shortages are
shifted to the Palestinian society, which lacks the financial means for
new investment and the necessary institutions to impose good
management to ensure that the best use is made of limited water
resources. The result is that Palestinian households exist at well
below the safety levels set by international organizations, and are
even below the 100 cubic meters per year that is set as the minimum
standard for household consumption on Israel."
The present Intifada has made things worse, due to the Israeli
siege of Palestinian towns and villages. Continuous disruptions have
caused the price of water deliveries to rise to great heights.
Considerable quantities of water are lost due to collateral damage
caused by shelling and bulldozering of pipelines and other
infrastructure by the Israeli army. This damage has been officially
10. HILAL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE EUPHRATES
AND TIGRIS RIVERS DISPUTE 333 (2002).
11. Peter Gleick defines basic human needs, regardless of climate, as 50 liters per
capita per day for personal use alone (18.25 m3/year); he also suggests 75 m3/year as
an appropriate minimum level per capita for the Middle East. See Basic Water
Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, 21 WATER INT'L 83, 87-90
(1996).
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reported by the World Bank and UNDP.12 On the other side of the
hill, Jewish settlements do not have to deal with these restrictions.
Settlers can provide themselves with the surroundings of a green lawn
and refreshing swimming pools. Unsurprisingly, this leads to bitter
frustration on the Palestinian side. Even Israeli journalists express
criticism of these effects of the occupation policy on Palestinian
attitudes and hardships. The Israeli authorities deny accusations that
their policies impose discriminatory water practices harmful to the
Palestinians. The Israelis contend that the existing Palestinian water
network has expanded under Israeli governance, and that water
consumption has increased by 20% since 1967. Israelis argue that if
there is an insufficient supply, it is mainly a result of Palestinian
mismanagement of the water system. The Palestinian authorities
respond by saying that, although the consumption has increased, the
population has grown faster, producing a net decrease in consumption
per capita.
A long-term water policy document of Israel looking ahead to
2020 was published in 2002. This offers a sensible and credible
approach to cope with increased water scarcity resulting from the
limited availability of natural resources combined with an increasing
demand for water due to population growth and economic
development, as well as shortages due to periodic droughts. This
report cannot only be read as a document designed for internal
aspects of water policy by the Israeli government. It also deals with
important water resources that are shared with the state of Jordan
and with the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories. 3
This report also shows an understanding of the extent to which water
has become a tool in political conflict, and how dysfunctional water
policies can undermine the prospects for sustainable development of
the population of the region.
The report demonstrates that between 1989 and 1998, the actual
level of per capita consumption increased from 101 cubic meters, to
128 cubic meters for the Jewish population. In the same period, the
level of water consumption by the non-Jewish sector increased from
29 cubic meters to 47 cubic meters.' The water consumption in
12. Deconinck, supra note 8. The damage to water and sewage infrastructure
during the period from September 2000 to March/April 2002 has been estimated at
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Israel, West Bank, and Jordan for the next 20 years is in the following
Table 1:
Distribution of Water Resources currently under Israeli Control
MILLION CUBIC METER)
YEAR WATER CONSUMPTION IN ISRAEL WEST BANK JORDAN
Domestic Industry Agriculture Potable Water Potable Water
2000 705 135 I 1150 30 55
2020 1120 190 1150 145 55
Source: Stefan Deconinck (2000)
This table shows that water demands cannot be met twenty years
from now by the water of rivers and aquifers, despite the
asymmetrical allocation of water among Israel, Palestine and Jordan.5
Therefore the Israeli government has to call upon additional, non-
conventional water resources, such as desalination and the use of
recycled water in agriculture, to meet projected demand.
One of the remedies considered to address Israeli water scarcity
was to import fresh water from Turkey. This project was first put on
the agenda in 1992 by the late Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal,
and was identified as the "Peace Pipeline." Over the years, a series of
technical problems relating to the economic feasibility, and the cost-
effectiveness of the project has led to a long period of negotiation
between the two countries. At one point, Israel proposed to Turkey
an exchange for water, in which Israel would supply Turkey with
military equipment and weaponry. 6 Very recently the water deal
between Turkey and Israel has been put in doubt. The new Turkish
government is currently reviewing the project due to the assassination
15. As part of the peace agreement with Jordan, Israel agreed to transfer a yearly
amount of 55 million cubic meters to Jordan. For the sake of the argument, it is
presumed that this amount will remain same in 2020. In practice, the yearly transfer
is even larger, around 75 million cubic meters a year. Id.
16. In 2002, the Israeli government agreed to purchase 50 million cubic meters of
water from Turkey each year for the next 20 years - a total of one billion cubic
meters of water at a rate of approximately USD 0.80 per cubic meter. This price was
more expensive than the expected rates for alternative water sources (the average
basic price for desalinated water was around USD 0.50 per cubic meter). The Israeli
government declared that the decision to import water was made due to political
strategic considerations, connected to the "complex relations between the two
countries." See ELVER, supra note 10.
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in 2004 of two prominent HAMAS leaders. This is a very unusual
step for the Turkish government to take, and seems designed to both
place political pressure on the Israeli government and lend support to
the Palestinians. 17
IV. Legal Cluster: The Oslo Accords
Over the years, a series of wars between Arab states and Israel
produced many unresolved problems. The Madrid Conference in
October 1991 hoped to provide the parties with solutions by way of a
negotiated settlement of the underlying conflict. Bilateral talks were
opened between Israel and each of its neighbors, and multilateral
talks were initiated on questions of international and regional
concerns, including water. After Madrid, a series of multilateral
meetings were held in various countries and several water issues were
discussed, including desalination, treatment of recycled water, and the
training of personnel for water projects. In these meetings allocation
formulas for the appropriation of water were not addressed, but
reserved for the future.
In November 1992, Israel and Jordan announced a written
agreement that embodied a peace treaty framework designed to lead
to a comprehensive settlement of all Jordanian-Israeli issues. This
agreement confirmed the understanding of both governments that the
sharing of water was as crucial for a viable peace treaty as was the
establishment of mutually agreeable borders and the assurance of
military security for all states of the region.
The second peace initiative signed on September 13, 1993 by
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the so-called Oslo
Framework of Principles, also reflected the significance of water
policy for the region. Among other things, Annex III of the Oslo
Framework established the Palestinian Water Authority. The
agreement contained a clause stating that the future control of water
sources and administration would be determined in the final stage of
negotiations because this issue was dependent upon a prior
determination of the permanent borders between Israel and
Palestinians.18 In Annex III of the Declaration, the customary
international law principle calling for an "equitable utilization of
shared water" was affirmed, although rather vaguely. This principle
17. Ahmet Zinc, Water Talks Near Boiling Point, ZAMAN, May 9, 2004, available
at <http.www.zaman.com/?bl=national&hn=8393> (visited Jan. 25, 2005).
18. SOFFER, supra note 5, at 176.
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is set forth in a number of international instruments and established
by state practice. The Interim Accord on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, or Oslo II, was signed on September 28, 1995. Oslo II
established a formal framework to address specific problems and to
meet agreed distribution targets for water in advance of the outcomes
of the final status negotiations. The critical question of responsibility
for the administration of the water regime in the West Bank (Judea
and Samaria) was postponed by the parties until the final stage of the
negotiating process. This stage was supposed to have begun in mid
1996, but it never took place.
Due to the importance of this source of water to Israel's overall
water balance, stringent measures of control were adopted by Israel's
Water Commission Administration from the beginning of the
occupation in 1967 until 1995. Agreements reached within the
framework of the peace process were designed to ensure that the
Palestinian population had access to no more than 20% of the
groundwater. The agreements thus reserved at least 80% of the
water for Israel's side of the Green Line and for their settlements in
the West Bank. The objective has been not only to fix allocations but
also to monitor their use and thus protect the quality of the supply
earmarked for Israel.' 9
By virtue of occupation, the water regime in the Occupied
Territories became subject to the Israeli water legislation, a move
highly questionable under the Fourth Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The water resources in the
Occupied Territories became a public property that could be
"destined for the requirements of its inhabitants and for the
development of the country", quoting the Israeli water law.0
Landowners could no longer claim any private rights to the water on
their property, and the authority over the water resources in the
Occupied Territories was transferred from villages and local
communities to the so-called Civil Administration. The military
commanders became responsible for granting exploitation licenses for
existing and new water installations. The institutional control over
the water resources was finally completed in 1982 when water
19. Lowi observes that "although some of the measures have been relaxed, the
distribution of water resources today remains roughly the same as it was prior to
agreements reached in 1995." Miriam Lowi, Water and Conflict in the Middle East
and South Asia: Are Environmental Issues and Security Issus Linked?, 8 J. ENV'T AND
DEV. 376,385 (1999).
20. See Deconinck, supra note 8.
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management for the Palestinian Territories was transferred to the
Israel national water company Mekorot. As a result of this situation,
the growing Palestinian demand for water has been systematically
ignored by the Israeli occupiers and the licenses sought by
Palestinians for water development were almost all refused.21
From an international law point of view, during the period
between 1967-1995, Israel was the occupying power managing the
water use in West Bank and Gaza, but subject to the constraining
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Palestinians emphasize
that Israel's extraction of water inside the West Bank since 1967 is a
direct violation of the Geneva Convention, which specifies the legal
obligations of a "belligerent occupier." According to the Geneva
Convention a belligerent occupier may use the natural resources of
the occupied land to support its military forces engaged in the
occupation. However, it may not use those resources to support its
own civilians even if located within the occupied territory. The
implementation of Geneva Convention makes the entire Israeli
settlements and their use of water illegal. International humanitarian
law also upholds the validity of local laws, and the legal rights
deriving there from. Both the protection of private property and the
maintenance of local law have implications for the regulation of
Palestinian water.22 Between 1995 and 2000, that is, until the start of
the second Intifada, Israel remained the de facto occupying power
despite the ambiguity surrounding the administration of the
Palestinian territories and Israel's claim that it had relinquished its
status as occupier due to the terms of the Oslo Accord, and the
process associated with its implementation.' After the year 2000,
Israel repudiated the Oslo Accord. Despite this move, Israel remains
obliged to adhere to the Fourth Geneva Convention in invoking its
rights as an occupying power, including the management of water use
on West Bank and Gaza. This obligation was unanimously affirmed
by the World Court in its Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004 on the
21. Id.
22. Abuali, supra note 4, at 443-61.
23. This argument is highly contested by Israel and some legal scholars, especially
the characterization of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as being international and, thus
the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the situation. The majority of the legal
scholars, however, are in favor of applicability of the Geneva Convention. See
Richard Falk & Burns Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian
Rights in West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARVARD INT'L
L.J. 129 (1991).
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legal status of the security wall.
After the collapse of the Oslo peace process, the most severe
tensions between the Palestinian Authority and the Israel
government arose from the dramatic expansion of Israeli settlements.
Their heavy use of water added a major political obstacle to the
already formidable challenge of resolving the underlying conflict.
The development of more powerful water installations and deeper
wells on the Jewish settlements caused many of the older Palestinian
wells to dry out. The majority of Palestinian wells are now no longer
in operation. Most of the Palestinian villagers are not connected to a
waterworks; these Palestinians must rely on tanker trucks or women
to carry water from distant wells to meet their daily needs.
With regard to Israel's neighboring countries, the picture is more
encouraging. In the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan of
1994, both countries seemed to have found ways to solve their
differences over the use of shared waters. However, the agreement
on the Jordan River is far from providing a solution that is of basin-
wide dimensions. The other riparian countries in the Jordan River
basin (Lebanon and Syria) and Palestinians are not parties to the
agreement, and as we know, Palestinian's access to Jordan River
water is already severely restricted.
Tension over water among neighboring countries continues. For
instance, in 2001 and 2002, infrastructure building in Lebanon
affected water flowing to Israel from the Hasbani and Wazzani rivers,
causing renewed tension between the two countries. The Golan
Heights still stand in the way of a rapprochement between Israel and
Syria. The continuing occupation of Palestinian territory and
displacement of millions in the Palestinian Diaspora continues to
threaten peace in the contested area west of the Jordan River; the
situation will only worsen if water policy is not restructured in a way
that balances the rights of both sides.
V. International Water Law Principles Governing Shared
Groundwater Resources
Aside from a few island nations, virtually every nation shares a
groundwater system with -one or more countries, and the majority of
the groundwater systems are related or linked directly to surface
water resources. Thus, transnational groundwater systems have
serious domestic and international implications. Unfortunately,
2005]
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appropriate scientific knowledge appears to be lacking for the
development of policies, laws, and management schemes related to
groundwater resources. Because groundwater resources are not
visible, their use, management, and conservation have to date
received very little attention in hydropolitics, and are generally
ignored issues in bilateral and multilateral agreements."
Nevertheless, the majority of legal scholars share the view that
sovereignty over groundwater resources must be restricted in the
same way as surface water, and that the same basic international legal
principles should apply to both surface and subsurface water
resources. However, there is no clearly established pattern of state
practice, or opinion iuris to provide guidance on this issue. 25
As the importance of groundwater has become more evident in
recent years, efforts were made to develop norms relevant to this
invisible resource. The International Law Association's Helsinki
Rules of 1966 (ILA, 1966) and the Seoul Rules of 1986 (ILA, 1986)
are among the few international documents to address directly the
status of groundwater under international law.26 Due to their non-
binding nature, however, the influence of these guidelines on state
practices and treaty development has been limited. 7
The United Nations Convention on the non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses of 1997 is the first formal,
24. A typical example is found in the several treaties dealing with waters shared
by the United States and Mexico. Despite the growing importance of groundwater to
the border regions, the treaties are silent on groundwater. See Rio Grande
Convention, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mexico, 34 U.S.T. 2953.
25. There is only one German court decision evidencing the applicability of the
same principles to surface and subsurface water resources. See Joseph Dellapenna,
The Evolving International Law of Transnational Aquifers, in MANAGEMENT OF
SHARED GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 241 (Eran Feitelson & Marwan Haddad eds.,
2001).
26. The Helsinki Rules included only those groundwaters that form part of an
"international drainage basin." For the full text of the Helsinki Rules, see The
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, at
<www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Helsinki-Rules> (visited, Jan. 25, 2005).
The Seoul Rules, however, use the larger and more hydrological concept of
"international aquifers" rather than "drainage basin". For the full text of the Seoul
Rules, see The Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters, at
<www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/SeoulRules>.
27. Nonetheless, specific agreements and understandings were reached for
managing a number of shared aquifers, including between France and Switzerland,
the United States and Canada, and other nations. Y. Eckstein & G.E. Eckstein,
Groundwater Resources and International Law in the Middle East Peace Process, 28
WATER INT'L 154, 158 (2003).
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intergovernmental codification of international law applicable to
groundwater resources. Nevertheless, a careful review of the
Convention's scope reveals that not all forms of groundwater are
covered by the Convention. Specifically, the Convention does not
apply to either the Mountain Aquifer or the Coastal Plain Basin
discussed earlier in Section 11.28 Article 2 excludes from the
Convention groundwater that is unrelated to any surface water. This
exclusion was explained by the observation that unrelated
groundwater cannot have problematic effects on surface water.29
Another definitional limitation specifically excludes groundwater
flowing to a terminus different than that of a hydraulically related
surface body of water. The definition certainly does not encompass
so-called "confined aquifers, aquifers that do not, in any meaningful
sense, connect to surface waters." This means that groundwater
resources are not consistently covered. This is especially true for arid
and semi-arid regions, like the Middle East, where the Convention is
basically irrelevant. For these groundwater resources, states must rely
on customary international law to determine their rights and resolve
their disputes.
VI. Customary International Law Principles and State Practices
Many of the common claims for water rights are based on either
"geography," that is the place where a river or aquifer originates and
how much of that territory falls within a certain state, or on
"chronology" entrenching rights for those using water for long
periods. Water allocation principles based on geography have given
rise to three major legal doctrines: (1) "Absolute sovereignty" (or
known as Harmon Doctrine) that gives priority to upstream riparians;
(2) "Absolute integrity," which is the opposite of the absolute
sovereignty approach, and privileges downstream riparians; and (3)
"Restricted sovereignty," which strikes a compromise between the
two principles, balancing the rights of upstream and downstream
countries. The latter doctrine gave rise to the rule of "equitable
28. The Convention does not encompass all ground waters; the Convention
defines a "watercourse" as "a system of surface waters and ground waters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally
flowing into a common terminus..." Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th
mtg., at Art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (1997).
29. Id.
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utilization." The criterion of chronology is considered legally as
"prior appropriation," that is "first in time, first in right." Despite
supportive arguments developed by some authors on behalf of this
principle it does not appear to qualify as an authoritative customary
water law principle. Prior use gives some legitimacy to a particular
use of water, but it may work against the environmental protection of
water resources in a specific case, especially by exerting pressure to
"use it or lose it."
The principle of equitable utilization may be understood as an
extension of the equity principle in international law. There exists
inevitably some uncertainty and ambiguity in substance of law
whenever the equity principle is relied upon to determine the basis of
legal rights. In each case the application of the equity principle will
vary according to specific individual conditions that are present. The
principle makes room for political compromise without the need to
decide which party to a dispute is legally correct. This doctrine does
not imply that each state should receive equal rights, but rather that
all states share sovereignty over the water resource, and their interest
must be reasonably balanced and upheld according to a range of
factors.3" The United Nations International Watercourses
Convention lists the factors that need to be taken into account as
follows: (1) geographic, hydrographic, climatic, ecological and other
characteristics; (2) the social and economic needs; (3) population; (4)
the effects of uses on other states; (5) existing and potential uses; (6)
conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resources and the costs of measures taken to that effect; and (7)
availability of alternatives to a particular use.
There is no priority indicated among these listed factors. The
relative weight of the factors depends on the circumstances and the
judgments of an interpreter. The content of the list, as a definition of
the reasonableness of shared water use, has been criticized widely by
various scholars and states. One criticism is, for instance, that the
principle of equitable use does not a priori preclude states from
sacrificing satisfaction of vital human needs for the sake of ill-fated
plans to make deserts bloom."
30. ELVER, supra note 10, at 136.
31. Andrea Nolkaemper, The Contribution of the International Law Commission
to International Water Law: Does it Reverse the Flight from Substance?, in
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn et al.
eds., 1996):
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Moreover, an emphasis on the social and economic needs of
states can operate as a very unjust factor if the riparian countries are
not at equal levels of development, such as is the case with respect to
Israel and Palestine. Does Israel deserve more per capita and overall
water use rights than the Palestinians, because they are economically
wealthier than Palestinians? 32
Finally, equitable utilization principle was not developed with
any broader consideration of the importance of the environmental
protection of water resources. It affords an insufficient basis for
measurement of more comprehensive environmental protection.33
While these principles provide basic guidelines to solve many
transboundary water conflicts, compliance is often contrary to state
interests, and thus problematic at the level of implementation. These
principles work rather well if there is sufficient water to satisfy .all
current demands on use. This is true also for the equitable utilization
principle. Even if each interested state agrees to the rule of equitable
utilization, states would still argue over the common standard of
sharing and the proper application of the common standard.
Moreover, some authors argue that the uniqueness of each river basin
renders virtually irrelevant the generalized and highly abstract
guidance offered for allocation. Such formulations are discarded
because they simply cannot capture the geographic distinctiveness of
each body of international water, including its hydrological, political,
or cultural aspects. A careful examination of past agreements might
have underscored the importance of taking account of the bearing of
historical and geographical perspectives on the solution of
international water problems.34
Evaluation and implementation of these abstract conditions in
relation to a specific conflict almost always presents a legal and
32. Sherif Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to International
Water Law: The Case of the Palestinian- Israeli Waters, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223
(1995). Applying the principles to the dispute between the Palestine population and
Israel, Elmusa argues on plausible grounds that the criteria of social and economic
needs would justify a substantial redistribution of water from Israel to the Palestinian
populations. Yet the principle also gives Israel grounds to argue that adverse affect
on irrigation and existing uses in Israel outweigh the needs of the Palestinian
population.
33. PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 250 (1992).
34. See WOLF, supra note 2, at 149; James L. Wescoat Jr., Beyond the River
Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and International
Watercourse Law, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 301 (1992).
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political challenge. Most likely, for the above mentioned reasons,
Israel and Palestinians will not be able to reach an agreement about
the interpretation of these principles of international law, such as
what constitutes an equitable and reasonable use of water. The
Israelis assert that prior to the Jewish influx into the region,
groundwater development was meager and supplied only minimal
agricultural and domestic needs. During the late 1800s and early
1900s, Jewish farmers began developing the region's groundwater
resources to support their expanding farming practices. Following the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, water resources
development further expanded to support the rapidly growing Israeli
economy. By 1967, and prior to Israel's occupation of the West Bank,
Israel was already utilizing a major portion of the available water
resources of the Western and Northeastern Basins through the full
development of springs, rivers, and wells in Israel. Today some 80%
of the waters of the Western Basin fall as rain in the West Bank,
while approximately 80% of the aquifer's waters are tapped by Israel
from wells within its pre-1967 borders. Thus, Israelis claim the right
to water naturally emerging or pumped in Israel and which they have
extracted since times predating the creation of the state. Moreover,
they base their claim on the significant damage that would result from
the loss of the Israel's current level of use, a level alleged to be
necessary to meet the country's vital economic and human needs.35
Palestinian development of the region's groundwater resources,
on the other hand, has been relatively limited and restricted in recent
years. Prior to 1948, few Palestinian villages had developed central
water supply systems. Later, under Jordanian administration of the
West Bank between 1948 and 1967, little if any improvement
occurred. 36 Nonetheless, Palestinians also make claims to the region's
groundwater based on historical use, territorial possession, and
human necessity. While they have not exploited the region's water
resources to their full potential, Palestinians have lived on the same
land for tens of generations. Furthermore, the Palestinians contend
that since most of the region's aquifer recharge falls as rain over the
West Bank, and that by virtue of their sovereignty over the territory,
they should have first opportunity to use and exploit the resources."One of the difficulties arises from the application of equitable
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utilization to groundwater resources. First of all, technical knowledge
about groundwater resources is relatively newer and more
controversial than surface waters. There are many unknowns about
the hydrological connections between the surface waters and
groundwater, and among various kinds of groundwater. Flowing
patterns, permeability, accessibility, durability, soil-water connections
- all must be determined properly to reach a just, equitable, and
sustainable system of appropriation of water that can then be
formalized in agreed legal arrangements. For instance, some Israelis
insist that the optimum well-sites for the Coastal and Mountain
aquifers are all in Israel because the aquifers are relatively close to
the surface there and can be tapped by shallow wells in Israel
including water to be allocated to the Palestinians. If this is so, do the
Palestinians have a legal right to drill wells in Israel, and then pump
the water back to the West Bank or to Gaza? The answer would
appear to be no, absent consent of the government of Israel.38 States
generally have no legal right to exploit their water resources without
the consent of other states if the point of entry to these water sources
is outside of state boundaries. Such consent usually is withheld unless
one state is in a position to dominate the relationship. In this case,
disallowance of Palestinian use would result in a sacrifice of economic
and ecological efficiency on the altar of national sovereignty.3 9
Israel and Palestinians also have different views on issues other
than the allocation principles, reflecting their different priorities.
Palestinians have been stressing arrangements pertaining to drawing
rights. Israelis seem more concerned with the protection of water
resources to offset pressures on capacity and the menace of pollution.
Israel claims that protection against pollution and overuse is crucial,
given that the country is on the downstream side of the Mountain
aquifer, a source of water that is very vulnerable to pollution that
originates in the West Bank. The necessity to utilize and protect
shared aquifers jointly stems from the fact that aquifers are
vulnerable to pollution, even more than surface water. Mutual
monitoring of the relevant activities on both sides of the political
border (actual amount of water use, location of wells, irrigation
methods, use of pesticides) is vital for both parties. For these tasks,
the establishment of a joint commission for water and environmental
38. Dellapenna, supra note 25, at 256.
39. Id.
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protection is indispensable. ' °  Nevertheless, until now, no joint
initiative has been worked to address such issues. Perpetuating the
status quo allows Israel to continue to act unilaterally. For Israel, a
longer period without any legally binding agreement signed between
Israel and Palestine is more consistent with their preference for the
unilateral management of water resources.
Palestinians argue that they suffer from severe shortages and
point to the huge disparity between the average amounts of water
available to each Israeli as compared to the quantity available to each
Palestinian. Thus, they claim that based on principles of human
rights, as well as by reference to internationally recognized standards
of minimum water requirements, they should be accorded a larger
share of water than at present. Because of lifestyle differences
between Palestinian and Israelis, there is unlikely to be a locally
agreed common definition of what constitutes the "domestic. use of
water" and whether it includes only direct human consumption or
also "household" livestock and gardens, swimming pools, etc.
4
'
Considering statistics on available water per capita in the region,
Israel is significantly better off than its neighbors other than Lebanon.
The difficulty arises due to the Israeli argument of entitlement to
"western living standards," and to its related right to treat the
maintenance of these western living standards as a "strategic
objective." 42
40. Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, Harnessing International Law to
Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 543, 565 (1993).
41. One of the significant behaviors of Israel is that it has compared its water
consumption with Western countries instead of neighboring countries. For instance,
showing that the Israeli urban sector is in no way extravagant in its consumption, an
Israeli writer states that "[p]resent levels of average per capita urban consumption in
Israel are in the range of 90 to 100 cum per annum. By comparison, the urban
demand in southern California, a region of similar climatic condition to those in
Israel, ranges from 250-300 cum per capita per annum." MARTIN SHERMAN, THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE HYDRO-
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT 12 (1999).
42. .Martin Sherman, political scientist and adviser to Israeli government on
agriculture and water issues, states that "Israel is a country virtually entirely devoid
of natural riches. She possesses no large reserves of land, no great forests, rivers or
mineral deposits. The only resource of significance she has at her disposal is the
human resource... [Hier very survival ... is dependent almost exclusively on the
quality and ability of her people... [I]t is clearly unfeasible to sustain such a
population over time without providing appropriate standard of living... Frequent
showers, swimming pools, well-groomed private gardens and public parks all involve
water consumption, without which adequate standards of modern life cannot be
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Significant economic inequality between Israelis and Palestinians
is another factor that complicates the search for common ground on
which to base water allocation principles. Israel has ample political,
financial, and technical capability to produce additional water for its
needs, such as recycling or reclaiming sewage water for agricultural
use, desalination of brackish or salty water, and transportation of
water from other regional water sources of supply, such as the Nile
River, or the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Palestinians, however, do
not have the financial power to use unconventional methods, or to
enter into international water transfer deals.
Due to the difficulty of agreeing upon the application of
"equitable utilization," criteria that are generally vague and often
contradictory, some have suggested allocation principles based on
human needs rather than on legal rights. Based on an influential
study of treaties relating to international water resources, the
conclusion is reached that in practice, states almost never rely on
broad conceptual ideas, and do not invoke extreme views of absolute
sovereignty.43 Many of the treaties simply divide water equally
between riparians. In arid regions, the assessors often shift quietly to
a needs-based criterion for water allocations, as measured by some
mutually agreeable parameter such as irrigable land or population, or
the requirements of specific projects. In agreements between Egypt
and Sudan signed in 1929 and in 1959, allocations were arrived at on
the basis of the respective local needs, primarily of agriculture.' In
the Jordan River, the Johnston Plan in 1953, based on TVA, was
shaped without regard to political boundaries, and was based on
satisfying agricultural needs. In the Interim Agreement of 1995, when
Israel first recognized Palestinian water rights on the West Bank, a
formula for agriculture and per capita consumption fixed future
Palestinian water needs at 70-80 MCM/year. In addition, Israel
agreed to provide 28.6 MCM/year toward meeting those needs." A
needs-based allocation is easier to apply, according to Aaron Wolf,
because rights are not quantifiable but needs are. It is easier to
quantify each nation's need, even allowing for differing
interpretations, once both sides feel comfortable because their
attained." Id. at 3-4.
43. See Aaron Wolf, From Rights to Needs, in MANAGEMENT OF SHARED
GROUNDWATER RESOURCES, supra note 25.
44. Id. at 135.
45. Id. at 138.
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minimum quantitative needs are being met. Negotiations eventually
turn to straightforward bargaining on issues arranged along a
common spectrum. The need-based calculation would be more
effective, especially in areas where riparian disputes exist not only
with respect to the river itself, but also with reference to shared
groundwater aquifers.
Advocates of the need-based equity approach propose the
consideration of new sources such as recycled waste-water or out-of-
basin water allocations, made with the help of technological tools.
The need-based approach also suggests efficiency measures to
decrease demand or reduce population growth. However, given the
nationalistic dimension of water projects, the domination of
agricultural policy, asymmetrical power between the parties, and
regional competition over already scarce water resources, the
calculation of acceptable and reasonable "needs" of aspiring users is
often highly problematic.46
Besides widely accepted principles of reasonable and equitable
utilization, there are now a growing number of examples of state
practices that can be used to provide guidelines for the allocation,
use, management, and conservation of shared groundwater resources.
However, some aspirational principles, such as integrated water
management (joint management), hydrological unity, ecosystem
approach, and water as a basic human right are yet to be widely and
formally accepted by the international community as customary law.
The only effective mechanism in water poor regions is joint
management of water resources through the participation of all basin
communities. The UN Watercourse Convention supports this
solution in numerous provisions, some of which go into considerable
detail.47 Equitable participation can only be realized through some
sort of joint management regime. The Convention, however, does
not contain a specific model for implementation of joint water
management for several reasons. First, the Convention has a
framework character that is to be used as guidance for bilateral or
basin-wide water agreements. And second, each international
46. ELVER, supra note 10, at 428.
47. Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, supra note 28, at Arts. 5(2), 8, 9, 11-19. Art. 5(2) states: "Watercourse
States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both
the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and
development thereof, as provided in the present articles."
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watercourse basin has specific hydrological and political conditions.
A priori models will not be effective and suitable for distinctly
different basins around the world. On the other hand, there are
several varieties of joint water management systems around the
world, ranging from reliance on continuing and incessant
consultations, to a system of active cooperative management that
remains in the hands of regional institutions capable of making and
enforcing their decisions directly.' Shared management of resources
requires sensitivity to the governments of riparian countries. States
will agree to confer sovereign authority on the shared institution only
if they retain important tools of control and limitation, such as veto
power and the assurance of procedures of petition and judicial review
to ensure reasonable control over the decision making process.
Effective joint management entails a substantial loss of sovereignty
over shared water resources. It is necessary to overcome this tension
between concerned states to construct these sophisticated
mechanisms for mutual benefit. 9
Integrated water management obliges parties to consult before
any action is taken unilaterally, and is the logical solution for arid and
semi-arid regions' scarce water resources. Such management
arrangements include the promise not to interfere with water uses in
other states, and to protect joint water resources against
environmental degradation and pollution. Nevertheless, logical
solutions are not always desirable. Treaties do not always reject
logical solutions, but generally tend to emphasize perceived needs
and power relations. ° Many of the transboundary water conflicts
confirm the importance of power-based hydropolitics, such as the
Nile, Jordan River Basins, or the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. The
creation of a formal legal system is a necessary precondition to
prevent conflict over water in any group of communities where water
resources are under stress. Ultimately, an absence of legal
arrangements will almost always lead to a revival of the law of
48. Dellapenna, supra note 25, at 252.
49. Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Framework of Joint Management Institutions for
Transboundary Water Resources, in MANAGEMENT OF SHARED GROUNDWATER
RESOURCES, supra note 25, at 407-28.
50. Dellapenna, supra note 25, at 247.
51. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global
Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES
Ass'N, 1301, 1320 (1999).
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vendetta. 2 Customary international water law principles appear to be
too conservative and primitive to solve water management problems,
especially in a region where water is scarce and countries are not able
and willing to cooperate on common problems.
IX. Conclusion
Implementation of international water law principles with
respect to the water conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
requires a highly imaginative initiative. The reality on the ground
does not give any hope. After 1967, the Israelis occupied all of the
aquifers shared between themselves and Palestinians, administrating
them primarily for their own benefit while deliberately squeezing the
amounts that others might be able to draw from common aquifers.
This reality is acknowledged by almost all international water law
writers, including some Israeli lawyers.53 International legal disputes
have focused on whether the Israelis were administering their
occupied lands in a fashion that violated the laws of armed conflict.
Whether the Israeli occupation policies dealt appropriately with the
water needs of the local inhabitants was often treated as a secondary
issue if it was noticed at all.54
One of the obstacles to solving the water conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians is a direct consequence of Israel's insistence on
the hydrological control of the region. This insistence is seldom
acknowledged publicly by Israel. Nevertheless, several Israeli writers
on water issues stress the issue that implementation of all currently
proposed peace initiatives, both on the Syrian and the Palestinian
tracks, would necessarily create a situation in which the authority and
control over much of Israel's water supply (almost up to 70%) would
be transferred from current Israeli control to that of Arab
governments. Further, Israeli writers who emphasize the strategic
value of water conclude that, in effect, Arabs would not only control
the fate of virtually the entire Israeli water system, but would also be
in a position to threaten the very physical survival of the country.
Extremist religious and ideological groups have always dramatized
the water scarcity in Israel. Especially after the Oslo Accords, by
52. Id. at 1316.
53. Benvenisti, Gharaibeh, Kahan, Kretzmer, Ott, Wolf and many others.
54. Dellapenna, supra note 25, at 263.
55. Id. at 251.
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agreeing to give up Israel's exclusive authority over water related
activity in the West Bank, some Israelis believe their government has
placed onerous limitations on Israel's already over-extended water
system."
The Israeli dependence on West Bank groundwater exposes one
of the reasons why Israel is not so easily relinquishing control of the
occupied territory. Moreover, intensive pumping of aquifers within
the territory could deteriorate the quality of groundwater that flows
beyond the Green Line into Israel. 7 For the Palestinians, however,
control over this "national" resource is equally important; the
socioeconomic development of a future Palestinian state will certainly
require harnessing domestic water supplies. No doubt, it is because
water resources and national security concerns are intimately linked
that the issue of achieving a common water policy of mutual benefit
seems unattainable. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that during the
peace talks, the discussion of water rights was put off until final status
negotiations together with other problematic issues. Interestingly, the
recent NGO peace initiative, known as the "Geneva Accord,"
deliberately avoids articulating water-sharing principles, again leaving
this thorny issue for the future, despite its claim to be comprehensive.
Due to the ongoing political hostility in the region, a unilateral
approach taken by Israel, Syria, and Jordan, is alarmingly dangerous
from the perspective of establishing sustainable and equitable use of
water resources by these countries. Between Israel and Palestinians,
no cooperative action of any substance has been taken since the Oslo
Interim Agreement of 1995. As will be seen in their long term water
policy document, the Israeli government chooses a national solution
to this regional problem. The water needs of neighboring countries
have been taken into account, but only as a unilateral Israeli
initiative. The decision to raise the Palestinian per capita
consumption to 70 cubic meters in 2020 is something that Israeli
government cannot decide on its own since the division of shared
56. "For the territorial concessions implicit in these accords not only involve
Israel yielding to the Arabs direct physical control over almost 70 percent of her
water supply, but also entail exposing other sources, over which she is supposed to
retain control, to the risk of severe ecological damage from hazards inside territory to
be evacuated by her." SHERMAN, supra note 41, at 2.
57. By way of example, an overview of annual extraction of water from the
coastal aquifer between 1980 and 1996 shows that in 16 years, there were only 5 years
without over extraction and 11 years with a deficit. Deconinck, supra note 8, part 2,
sec. 1.
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water resources between Israeli and the Palestinian population in
West Bank remains subject to a final peace agreement that still has to
be concluded. 8
The water issue is closely connected to territorial questions in the
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian context. While the link between
water resources and political alternatives is inextricable, water
scarcity is the key obstacle to solving the wider conflict.
Asymmetrical water use between Israelis and Palestinians based on
Israel's denial of Palestinians' water rights and a paternalistic attitude
over the West Bank aggravates an already tense relationship. The
current policy of Israel on settlements creates unsolvable problems of
water shortages that affect both Israel and Palestine. Water has
historically been a factor in Middle East population distribution,
including influencing the delimitation of some international borders.
Successful negotiations over Jewish immigration or Palestinian "right
of return" will have to incorporate the hydrologic limitations of the
region.
An additional point is the necessity of agricultural reform, and
the beneficial use of technology by international institutions. It is also
agreed that the best conservation methods, changing consumption
patterns, implementing more rational water policy, and especially
reducing the proportion of water allocated to agriculture, are vital for
the future of the concerned countries. Agricultural activity and policy
cannot be isolated from the water issues in arid countries. In Israel,
Jordan and the West Bank, approximately 70% of water consumption
is devoted to irrigated agricultural activity. In Gaza the proportion is
86%. The irrigated agricultural sector in Jordan, the West Bank and
Gaza has relied on the availability of cheap, unskilled labor for their
profitability. A competitive environment requires well-educated
farmers growing higher value-added export crops supported by labor
capable of adapting to higher standards of technology and quality
control and sophisticated handling and marketing facilities.
According to estimates cited by the World Bank, the value added to
water uses for irrigated agriculture in the region is 30 cents per cubic
meter compared to $15 per cubic meter for industry. These figures
suggest that decision making applicable to water use in the region is
58. The plan states that the amount 70 cubic meters is a figure agreed upon
during the activities of the Joint Water Commission, established by the Interim
Agreement between Israel and PLO in 1995. But Palestinian members of the
committee assert that this is not true to the facts. Id. part 2, sec. 5d.
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not compatible with market logic. In Israel, reduction of water
consumption in the agricultural sector is not even negotiable. The
preservation of agricultural production goes with the ideology of "the
land must remain green" " Therefore; international institutions
should provide aid to Palestinians partly to reduce ongoing unjust
water management in the region. Resolution of water disputes
between Israelis, Palestinians and their neighbors requires, besides
reduction of political tension, intense cooperation among riparian
countries and effective involvement of international organizations to
ensure efficient and sustainable management that allows water to be
shared in an equitable and reasonable manner. No dispute between
Arabs and Israelis, on water or on any other issue, has ever been
resolved without third-party (usually the United States) sponsorship
and active participation. However, the participation of any third
party should be based on international participation, rather than
relying on a state that is partial to the Israeli side. Particularly in
solving water dispute, participation of an international tribunal is
likely to be very important, given the parties' unequal political,
military and especially economic power.
59. The statement belongs to a staff member at the Water Commissioner's office.
Id. part 2, sec. 2.
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